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Abstract
This paper addresses the nature of the demand schedule for emerging market assets in
both its macroeconomic and microeconomic dimensions. The former is usually analysed
in terms of the ‘push factors’ (such as interest rates or contagion) determining
international capital flows; while the latter is normally approached through the portfolio
composition decisions (such as herding or risk appetite) of investment managers.
Bringing these two perspectives together contributes to an understanding of how sudden
shifts in the demand schedule can cause large and asymmetric shocks for emerging
market countries. Official interventions by agencies such as the IMF focus on ‘supply’
interventions (such as improving information or avoiding default) and neglect the need
to stabilise demand. The paper suggests that official intervention is required in order to
stabilise and lengthen demand schedules, and thus construct an orderly international
market in emerging market assets.
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1 Introduction
The expansion and contraction of portfolio capital flows and short-term bank lending
from OECD countries in emerging markets during the past decade has generated a large
and controversial literature. Most of this debate has focussed on the effect of these flows
on emerging markets themselves, and the effect of host country policies on the
attraction or retention of these flows. However, the process by which credit providers
and portfolio investors make their decisions is much more than a simple decision to
‘supply’ a specific amount of capital to emerging markets at a given average risk and
price, and then allocate this between individual emerging markets according to local
risk and return characteristics – the so-called ‘fundamentals’.
In any market, changes in both the level of transactions flows and the prices at which
they take place must reflect shifts in either the demand schedule or the supply schedule
(or both simultaneously) and that both these schedules will be affected by agents’
expectations as to the future evolution of the market. Fortunately increasing attention is
being paid to two dimensions of what this paper terms – as seems logical – the demand
for emerging market assets. The first strand in the recent literature relates to what are
frequently but somewhat misleadingly called ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors determining
capital flows at the macroeconomic level. The aggregate level of capital flows to
emerging markets is held to be determined by the push factors, which include market
conditions in the source country and the return on emerging markets as a whole. The
pull factors are the conditions in the destination countries, which determine the
allocation of the aggregate flow across the emerging markets. The second strand relates
to the determinants of investors’ decisions to purchase (or sell) emerging market assets
at the microeconomic level. Portfolio choice models thus include source country
conditions as determining the opportunity cost of capital (that is, the risk-free portion of
the portfolio) and the overall asset stock; while destination country conditions determine
the yield and risk of emerging market assets.
From the first strand it is apparent that shifts in aggregate asset demand (i.e. changes in
the ‘push factors’) such as OECD interest rates and G3 exchange rate fluctuations
account for at least half of the observed changes in capital flows, independently of the
asset supply (i.e. ‘pull’) conditions – that is the so-called ‘fundamentals’ in emerging
markets themselves. From the second strand it is clear that not only information about
fundamentals matters to individual investors decisions, but also the way in which the
information is used, endogenous cycles in risk appetite, and the effect of regulatory
incentives – all of which are determined by conditions in the source country.
In effect, the demand schedule for emerging market assets is three-dimensional. As well
as price (or yield) on one axis, so to speak, and the quantity of assets on another axis,
there exists a third dimension that can be broadly termed ‘quality’ on another. This is no
different in principle from the market for, say, automobiles – except, as we shall see,
quality is not a stable or exogenous factor. Nor, as we shall see is it a ‘market in lemons’
where quality is unknown to the buyer alone. The supply schedule (i.e. emission or
resale by government, company or bank concerned) has the same three dimensions.
Ideally, quality is the given risk of debt default, dividend collapse or major devaluation
as determined by ‘fundamentals’ of the country and its companies, so that interaction
between stable demand and supply schedules will determine the price and quantity at2
which the market in assets clears. Changes in this equilibrium over time are then the
observed capital flows. Variations in asset quality as fundamentals alter due to external
shocks or domestic politics will be reflected in changing prices and flows as markets
adjust to the changed circumstances. The object of emerging market governments (and
their international advisors) is then to improve asset quality by sound (or sounder)
management so that either asset prices improve (i.e. yield spreads fall) or more assets
can be supplied (i.e. capital inflows be attracted) at the going price.
Asset prices are the information directly available to the market, but only in the form
past and current values and yields. However, the future prices (or indeed the appropriate
long-term price trend) are an essential aspect of ‘price’ and are a matter of investor
expectations rather than measurable data. Moreover, the quantity dimension is
ambiguous, for two reasons. First, because what is recorded (e.g. in balance of payments
statistics) is the value of the flows (price times quantity) made up of innumerable
transactions, and while the number of securities transactions could in principle be
counted there is no clear definition of the volume index to be used to aggregate them.
Second, because the changes in the stocks of financial assets (which are what is
recorded at the firm level) reflect not only new flows but also stock revaluations. Ideally
then, we need records of asset stock volumes and prices, with the changes decomposed
into flows and revaluations.1
The third dimension of ‘quality’ is the most difficult to define. It should reflect risk, of
course, but this cannot be ascertained merely from the volatility of returns in the past
because it also contains market expectations of future yields and volatility (which may
vary not only with the underlying fundamentals but also with market beliefs about that
future) on the one hand and the role of the asset in the investor’s portfolio – including
its covariance with other assets, their respective yields, and her degree of risk aversion –
on the other. If markets cleared properly and price reflected quality fully then this would
not present a practical measurement problem although it could still present an obstacle
to the design of policy to reduce volatility.
In terms of elementary algebra, we have two equations (demand and supply) in three
variables – price, quantity and quality (risk). This system cannot be solved without a
third equation, of course. If a single stable relationship between price and risk exists, as
financial textbooks suppose, then this constitutes the ‘third equation’ and the system
solves – that is, there is market equilibrium. In practice, however, this stable
relationship does not exist so, in effect, there is a market failure.2 The response of
agents is to construct heuristic ‘rules of thumb’ that reflect practical experience about
the observed relationships between quality and quantity. This response is made explicit
in management rules for credit rationing and portfolio benchmarking at the
microeconomic level. It is also implicit in asset bubbles and regional contagion
observed at the macroeconomic level.
1 This problem is discussed in depth in Luttick (1998), who also addresses the problem of the major
inconsistencies between asset-liability and inflow-outflow statistics recorded by the countries of origin
and destination.
2 We return to this issue in Section 3 of this paper.3
These kinds of quantity-quality linkages are a familiar characteristic of domestic
financial markets. A ‘backward sloping supply curve of credit’ occurs where lenders are
increasingly unwilling to lend to borrowers as their debt mounts, and that offer of higher
yields (i.e. lower prices) does not stimulate more lending (i.e. asset demand) because it
reduces the capacity of the borrower to pay. By extension, further lending to a single
client will increase the investor’s risk exposure thus affecting quality as well as price.
Thus profit maximisation by lenders leads to a situation where the demand for loans is
not fully met at the current ‘price’ (that is return for a given risk class). In consequence
shifts in the asset demand schedule (i.e. credit supply) that determine the credit flow. At
the aggregate level, these credit shifts then have substantial effects on output – further
affecting asset quality and amplifying the cycle.
Finally, the way in which investors assess asset quality also depends on the way in
which the information is used – not just the asymmetry in its availability to buyer and
seller that the textbooks assume. The path-dependent formation of expectations and
difficulties in assessing future contract compliance limit the ability of investors to adopt
an optimal portfolio position defined entirely by expected returns and measurable
volatility. Indeed the widespread ‘benchmark’ approach, by defining a range and a
central position for portfolio composition, itself implies that an objective definition of
asset quality is not available to be priced. Limits on exposure to a particular country by
a single bank across all its asset purchases have a similar effect. This is the aspect of the
demand function that is most difficult to assess, particularly because the way in which
investing institutions use information (public or private) to reach this conclusion can
change as well as the circumstances themselves.
This paper is therefore structured as follows. Section 2 attempts to derive the main
macroeconomic characteristics of the emerging market asset demand schedule from the
literature on ‘push’ factors in capital flows, which emphasises the asymmetric effect of
changes in monetary conditions on OECD markets and ‘pure contagion’. Section 3
reviews recent work on portfolio composition decisions by fund managers in order to
establish the key microeconomic characteristics, particularly the roots of herding and
risk appetite in bounded rationality. Bringing these two perspectives together in
Section 4 provides the basis for a critique of official market interventions for their
limited effect on demand conditions. Finally, Section 5 concludes by suggesting that
more determined efforts to stabilise and lengthen demand schedules may be necessary
in order to restore an orderly market in emerging market assets.
2 Push factors and credit cycles – the macroeconomic dimension of the asset
demand schedule
Changing investor perceptions are clearly related to international capital market
instability. For instance, before the Asian crisis, five factors were considered to
determine market access – or rather ‘re-entry’ after the debt crisis of the 1980s (IMF
1992, pp. 45 et seq.). First, sound macro policies to reduce perceptions of country
transfer risk. Second structural reforms such as privatisation and financial liberalisation
in order to provide attractive assets in the form of equities and treasury bills. Third, the
restructuring of existing commercial debt in order to reduce the disincentive effect of
large debt burdens on private investment. Fourth, a solid record of servicing claims4
since 1982 crisis to enhance reputation among investors. And fifth, the reduced
transactions cost implied by modern technology and integrated markets.
These were all essentially issues related to the quality and supply of assets rather than
the demand for them, despite the fact that the ERM crisis had recently demonstrated that
private sector behaviour could be highly destabilising, and that self-fulfilling
speculative attacks could be encouraged by the availability of bank credit for this
purpose (IMF 1993 – in particular Section 4 ‘private sector behaviour during crisis’). In
particular, the role of highly leveraged institutions such as hedge funds and the
proprietary trading desks of investment banks could create rapid changes in the demand
for particular asset classes and thus destabilise particular markets (IMF 1994). Further it
also became clear that speculative activities across the interstices of the international
financial system were not simple arbitrage but actually created systemic settlement and
liquidity risks (IMF, pp. 34–7 and 120–38).
This somewhat belated recognition3 of the destabilising potential of endogenous
investor behaviour (despite the fact that domestic financial regulation takes this for
granted) led in turn to urgent official attention to the need to regulate international
banking on a cross-border basis (IMF 1997); to the problem of herding behaviour by
portfolio investors – particularly fund managers – and contagion there from between
emerging markets (IMF 1998, pp. 69–71); and finally the need for ratings agencies to
take into account the exposure of private banks as well as macroeconomic data (IMF
1999, pp. 101–15 and 180–203). This overdue acceptance by the fund of the fact that
demand schedule shifts are a major cause of instability in capital flows and beyond the
control of emerging markets themselves, has not however been matched by any
corresponding initiative to stabilise that demand.
In consequence, formal analytical modelling of international capital markets in
aggregate (as opposed to the microeconomics of portfolio behaviour) has made little
progress – in sharp contrast to the valuable contributions of trade theory to the
formulation of international trade policy in practice. Sticky prices, market segmentation,
heterogeneous investors, persistent currency misalignments despite arbitrage and the
cost of scarce information all need to be accounted for if the model is even to
approximate the real world in a useful way (Dumas 1994). Indeed the divergence of
asset prices from their fundamental values is a systemic characteristic of all capital
markets and while it is a zero sum game for the financial agents directly involved the
effects on the real economy are far from negligible, and must be taken into account by
regulators (Tobin 1998, ch. 6).
As the demand for and supply of emerging market assets does not come into
equilibrium, an explicitly disequilibrium econometric framework is clearly required in
practice as well (Agenor 1998). Models of ‘credit crunches’ are a familiar approach to
the analysis of domestic capital markets (Blinder 1987), but not generally used in
international finance. These models would imply that a ‘pecking order’ of FDI, debt and
equity would also be required for such a framework, consistent with asymmetric
information and finance theory (Razin et al. 1998). Above all, the effect of demand
changes on asset prices and flows is likely to be asymmetric in the sense that an increase
3 Not that this had been absent from the critical economics literature, of course, from Keynes through
Kindelberger.5
(or decrease) in demand would not affect all assets equally, but rather prices and
quantities stable the safer the asset.
One of the few instances of this approach is the detailed examination of capital flows to
four emerging markets – Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and Korea – by Mody and Taylor
(2001). They find that the ‘short’ side of the market, which can vary over the cycle,
determines the level of the flows. It is thus possible to determine instances of
‘international capital crunch’ where flows are curtailed because of lender rationing. In
particular, the results show that higher US yield-spreads are associated with credit
crunches for emerging markets. Their analysis also highlights the role of asymmetric
information (as distinct from default risk) in conditioning capital flows. There is also
ample evidence that domestic investors are better informed about payoffs in their own
market than foreign investors in both Europe (Gehrig 1993) and Japan (Kang and Stulz
1994), leading to home bias. There is also evidence of domestic investors moving out of
markets in crisis before foreigners do in the cases of in Korea (Kim and Wei 1999) and
Mexico (Frankel and Schmukler 1996). This leads Brennan and Cao (1997) to suggest
that while foreign equity purchases may be an increasing function of returns, due to the
cumulative information advantage, news will cause foreign investors’ to revise their
positions more than domestic ones would.
The relative role of push and pull factors taken separately in determining fluctuations in
capital flows has been researched empirically, particularly for the outward surge of the
early 1990s, although there was no general consensus on the relative roles played by
these factors at that time. However Calvo et al. (1993) stress external factors because
reforming and non-reforming countries were similarly affected and at same time. The
key factor is the poor return on safe assets in G3 (especially the US) that leads to an
incentive to search for higher return. By the mid-1990s, Fernandez-Arias (1996) can
conclude that the ‘push’ factor predominated on the weight of the evidence by the mid-
1990s, falling US interest rates being the key. By extension, sustained US asset price
growth in the late 1990s would explain the decline in demand – as well as supply
quality problems in merging markets themselves. Montiel and Reinhart (2001) can thus
conclude that the key push factors are those that reduce the attractiveness (risk-return
characteristics) of industrial country debtors and thus relate the demand for emerging
market assets. This is related to the business cycle: the collapse of Japanese asset prices
on the one hand, and low US and European interest rates on the other are cited for early
1990s. Longer-term push (i.e. demand) factors include changes in financial structure in
industrial countries, such as rise of mutual funds, where the small emerging market
share in their growing portfolios allows for longer-term upward trend. According to
these authors, at least half of observed variations in capital flows during the 1990s can
be explained by these ‘push’ factors.
More recently attention has turned to the downturn in the capital flows cycle at the turn
of the century. As Figure 1a indicates, the cumulative stock positions for emerging
market bonds, loans and equity seem to indicate that a stable position was approached in
the second half of the decade after the rapid stock expansion of the first half. In
addition, within these totals it is clear that towards the end of the decade there has been
a shift towards higher-quality assets such as syndicated loans to affiliates of
multinational corporations, investment grade bonds and corporate equity traded on
international exchanges. This might imply that the boom was in fact a stock re-
adjustment following an earlier decline in demand due to deterioration of asset quality
(that is the ‘debt crisis’) on the one hand, and the expansion of asset supply due to6
utilities privatisation and financial liberalisation on the other. The recent ‘drought’
would then reflect deteriorating asset quality and a reduced supply of assets as
privatisations are completed and sovereign issuers reduce their public sector borrowing
under adverse circumstances (IMF 2001).
However, Figure 1b indicates another possible explanation. It is clear that in the case of
US mutual funds at least, demand for emerging market assets is closely correlated for
the demand for international assets more generally. In other words, the ‘push’ factors
determining the latter – including relative returns, portfolio diversification and home
bias – are dominating the ‘pull factor’. A similar pattern can be observed for
international bank portfolios, which have kept on growing at the end of the decade
while the emerging market share has steadily declined (IMF 2001, p. 23). The
divergence in the late 1990s can then be attributed to asset quality decline (that is, the
successive emerging market crises) although it should be remembered that this too is
related to the previous upsurge of demand creating an asset bubble. Similar effects have
been detected in the bubble in technology stocks, with which emerging market equities
and bonds appear to constitute a single asset risk-return class for many institutional
investors.
In addition, as Figure 1c demonstrates, there is also evidence of increasing cross-
correlation of emerging market assets in times of crises due to broad selling. For this
high and variable degree of contagion ‘common external factors and lack of investor
discrimination are the more likely explanators’ (IMF 2001, p. 18). In downswings, the
lack of safe havens within an asset class also appears to increase cross-correlation.
Eleven ‘droughts’ of varying length are identified by the authors between 1993 and
2001, defined as periods when the primary dollar market is effectively closed to the
main non-investment grade borrowers. Rate spread widening and market volatility are
found to be key factors preceding such market closures: markets tend to reopen when
spreads stabilise or narrow again; these factors also cause issuers to delay issuing – so
there is a supply effect as well. However, closure tends to be sudden and opening
gradual because ‘while there has typically been a key discrete event that closes markets,
there has typically not been a clearly identifiable discrete event that reopens them.’
(IMF 2001, p. 20).
In sum, it is clear from the macroeconomic evidence on capital flows that that shifts in
the demand schedule for emerging markets assets have disproportionate effects on both
prices (yields) and quantities (flows), causing major macroeconomic shocks that in turn
affect asset supply in terms of both asset quality (i.e. economic stability and default risk)
and asset supply. The factors that cause these shifts include the cost (interest rates) and
availability of capital – that is the OECD business cycle - on the one hand, and changes
in risk aversion on the other. Risk aversion itself depends on home market conditions,
but also the experience of previous crises and the contagion of whole asset classes,
independently of the underlying ‘fundamentals’ – which in turn change over time as
collective perceptions of the causes of emerging market instability change. However, to
understand the changes in risk aversion it is necessary to turn to the microeconomic
evidence on investor behaviour.7
Figure 1
Aggregate trends in emerging market asset demand
Figure 1a
Trends in emerging market asset stocks
Figure 1b
Aggregate asset demand composition8
Figure 1c
Trends in contagion
Source: IMF (2001)
3 Momentum trading and risk appetite – the microeconomic dimension of the
asset demand schedule
For some time it has been clear that the microeconomic logic of investment behaviour in
response to particular financial incentives, and the way that investors use information,
can have severe consequences for the pricing of developing country stocks, quite
independently of the underlying ‘fundamentals’.4 The consequent asset bubbles can
have a serious impact on the real economy in both developed and developing countries
even in the presence of low inflation, fiscal balance and monetary rectitude (IMF 2000).
The principles of investor valuation in terms of risk and return of assets in a portfolio
are well known, but also the question of the liquidity of emerging market assets (almost
a form of contract uncertainty) is relevant in view of the possibility of market collapse.
Liquidity then relates to the perception of other buyers’ reactions to news (herding and
contagion), and also to the anticipated actions of public authorities (so-called ‘moral
hazard’). In consequence, asset valuation methods and portfolio composition rules in
practice tend to be rather crude, being largely based on considerations of liquidity and
exit possibilities (Clark et al. 1993).
However, there are limitations to the use of yield spreads on emerging market bonds as
evidence of markets perception of asset quality in the form of underlying default risk. A
measure of yield dispersion as well as of co-movements is necessary in order to see if
the effects of shocks are common to all the bonds surveyed, and the time profile of risk
is also needed to detect investor demand for liquidity. Moreover, ‘care is needed in
4 See IMF (1995) – in particular Section 5 (pp.37–44) ‘Institutional investor behaviour and the pricing
of developing country stocks’.9
interpreting yield spreads, since they are influenced by a variety of factors other than the
perceived creditworthiness of the borrower including investors’ appetite for risk and the
liquidity of particular instruments’ (Cunningham et al. 2001, pp.175). In particular
‘changes in risk appetite follow from change in preferences or institutional factors, such
as the need to adjust portfolios following losses incurred on holdings of other risky
assets’ (op. cit. pp.185).
Yield dispersion has increased over time as well as increasing after crises, which can be
interpreted as growing investor discrimination in a cumulative learning process.
However, it is still the case that beyond investment grade5, the relationship between risk
(as reflected in ratings) and price (reflected in yield spreads) tends to break down –
particularly during droughts when credit rationing reduces transactions volume severely.
Moreover, to the extent that the yield spread term structure slopes upward (because
default risk increases into the future) then average yield measures will be distorted when
composition changes through the cycle according to liquidity preference.
Moreover, we understand very little about how information is actually used in these
investment decisions. In particular, perceptions of risk cannot reliably be based on
econometric analysis of past trends, due to both the lack of data and the persistence of
structural breaks. Under conditions of uncertainty not only is the most recent and
‘timely’ information used (such as reserve levels or asset price trends – by chartists)
rather than more informative data, but also judgement is strongly affected by the
implicit models used by investors. Moreover, in view of the cost of information (i.e.
research), its untimeliness, and its uncertainty portfolio investors logically prefer to
mover quickly in response to news instead. Finally, the incentives faced by fund
managers themselves (such as quarterly performance bonuses based on performance
relative to the industry average) are widely considered to exacerbate this behaviour.
In effect, as Keynes pointed out a long time ago, uncertainty cannot be reduced to risk
or probability, rather it is related to the strength or degree of belief. Thus ‘people
evaluate the probability of events by the degree to which these events are representative
of the relevant model or process’ (Kahneman et al. 1982, p.97). Perceptions of risk
under circumstances that are difficult to imagine (low ‘availability’) or have not been
experienced before, are systematically underestimates as the event is felt to be unlikely.
In general, ‘although the language of probability can be used to express any form of
uncertainty, the laws of probability theory do not apply to all variants of uncertainty
with equal force’ (op. cit p.519).
An interesting application of this insight is provided by de Grauwe’s model of the ‘band
of agnosticism’ in exchange rates, within which demand is stable, but once breached
leads to large demand shifts. This reflects ‘rational behaviour in an uncertain world’
(de Grauwe 1996, pp.181–206). He argues that ‘the idea that economic agents compute
a future exchange rate based on a model they believe in, then telescope it back into the
present, is of little use in a world where economic agents have great difficulty in
working out what the true model of the world is’ (op. cit. p.189). Under these
circumstances, surprisingly small information costs will lead to quite large asset price
5 According to the Bank of England, the spread/rating curve tends to the origin, moves through 250
basis points at Moody’s A2 and 500 basis points at B3, becoming asymptotic to infinity beyond B3
(Cunningham et al. 2001).10
bands of this type.6 De Grauwe also suggests that ‘the band of agnosticism is also a
breeding ground for fads which, in the absence of credible alternatives, are elevated to
important theories’ (op.cit. p. 202) and concludes that ‘movements of real exchange
rates are, within certain bounds, inexplicable’ (op.cit. p.209) – all one can do is to make
probabilistic statements about them.
Another direction is provided by recent work on herding by investors, which indicates
that three causes can be involved. First, payoff externalities where payoff to an agent
adopting an action is positively related to the number of agents adopting the same
action. Second, principle-agent considerations such that a manager, in order to maintain
or gain reputation when markets are imperfectly informed, may prefer either to ‘hide in
the herd’ to avoid evaluation or ‘ride the herd’ in order to improve reputation. And
third, information cascades where later agents, inferring information from the actions of
prior agents, optimally decide to ignore their own information (Devenow and Welck
1996). Here too the use of information is as important as its availability.
The macroeconomic variables discussed in the previous section of this chapter also
enter into standard models of portfolio optimisation as the basis for asset allocation by
fund managers (Disyatat and Gelos 2001). Clearly higher home interest rates, lower
volatility in home assets, higher covariance between these and emerging market assets,
and higher risk aversion will all reduce demand for emerging market assets
independently of the supply conditions. Further, the benchmarking model explains
pervasive herding behaviour and thus the ‘momentum’ effect of demand for an asset
becoming a positive function of the quantity (capital flow) itself. These models take
both the risk aversion of investors and the characteristics of assets themselves as given.
There is, however, good reason to see risk aversion (or ‘risk appetite’) as a variable in
itself which is not only changing but also path dependent, varying with past experience
of yields and bubbles and thus potentially strongly pro-cyclical. Thus the prevalence of
‘home bias’, particularly under conditions of uncertainty, is clearly part of the problem
for emerging markets as an asset class, and not just a structural factor.
US pension funds hold between 1.5 and 2.0 per cent of their portfolios in emerging
market assets, mainly through mutual funds: these mutual funds in turn account for
about 10 per cent of market capitalisation in the host countries (Kaminsky et al.
2000b).7 Econometric analysis of this evidence clearly indicates that funds’ momentum
trading in emerging market equities is positive – they systemically buy winners and sell
losers (Kaminsky et al. 2000a). Contemporaneous momentum (buying winners and
selling losers) is stronger during crises; lagged momentum trading (buying past winners
and selling past losers) is stronger during non-crises. Investors also engage in contagion
trading, that is they sell assets from one country when asset prices fall in another. This
World Bank study also found differences between the behaviour of fund managers and
direct investors, with managers more likely to engage in momentum trading, partly
because individuals flee mutual funds during crises even of fundamentals do not warrant
it.
6 The size of the band (that is, the speculative estimate of future exchange rate minus forward price)
must logically be greater than the square root of the volatility multiplied by the risk aversion
coefficient and the cost of information. An increase of 1 per cent in information costs as a proportion
of the gain from the transaction can widen the bandwidth by 20 per cent under reasonable parameter
assumptions.
7 These are World Bank estimates for 1997; the total assets involved totalling US$50–70 bn.11
Figure 2
Global Risk Aversion
Source: IMF (2001)
In a similar vein, an IMF research study explores the portfolio data for dedicated US
mutual funds to assess whether they follow benchmarks or portfolio rebalancing rules
(Disyatat and Gelos 2001). The authors find that benchmarking explains observed
behaviour better than a rebalancing rule implied by the standard mean-variance
optimisation model, but do not explore variations in risk aversion over time. None the
less, the fund does recognise that risk appetite changes over time in practice, and uses
for this purpose the JP Morgan ‘Global Risk Aversion Index (IMF 2001) which
measures monetary liquidity and credit premia (see Figure 2). The Bank of England,
however, warns that ‘it is difficult to construct robust indicators of risk appetite’
because of the problem of separating out the effects of pure contagion and underlying
fundamentals in aggregate indicators8 (Cunningham et al. 2001, p.185).
8 Such as J.P. Morgan’s EMBI Global Index (IMF 2001).12
It is thus necessary to construct a model of risk aversion (or risk appetite) that suspends
the CARA assumption, allowing for the observed cyclical behaviour in risk appetite and
asymmetry through the cycle with risk aversion rising suddenly in a crisis and only
slowly declining afterwards. Kumar and Persaud (2001) suggest how this might be
done, by arguing that observed spreads should not be explained in terms of the
difference between global risk (a) and the variance of the asset price (s
2)a si s
conventionally done, but rather the product of risk appetite (K) and the standard
deviation of the asset price (P). This in turn defines the expected return E(R),w h i c hi s
measured as the difference between the long-term asset price LR(P) and the current
price P.
This formulation has two advantages: first, it allows risk appetite to be separately
estimated, and second, it reflects the fact that variations in risk appetite will have
proportionately larger effects on riskier asset prices.
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This formulation has the attractive property that the effect of global risk is symmetrical
on emerging market asset prices, but the effect of risk appetite varies with the riskiness
of the asset price itself:
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It also means that K can be estimated separately as a coefficient in the regression of the
volatility of an asset on its price. Empirical tests by the authors on leading emerging
market currencies clearly demonstrate the cyclical behaviour in risk appetite (K)a n d
support the hypothesis that the more volatile (riskier) an asset is, the greater the rise in
expected return in relation to the general level of risk. That is, demand schedule for
emerging market assets will be both steeper and more volatile than that for home assets.
At the microeconomic level, we can draw together the factors discussed above in a
simple way by exploring a simple framework for asset allocation in a portfolio made up
of two9 asset classes, the emerging market asset (1) and the ‘home’ asset (2), with
expected returns (r) and risk profiles (s
2)s u c ht h a t
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2
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The share (w) of emerging market assets in the portfolio and the covariance between the
two asset classes (￿12) then determines its overall return (R)a n dv a r i a n c e( ￿
2)
characteristics
9 In fact it would be more realistic to build a ‘decision tree’ in the way that trade modellers do (deriving
in fact from models of aggregate consumption) allowing for successive stages of disaggregation. Thus
the first division would be between home and international assets, the second within international
assets between OECD and emerging markets, the third within emerging markets between regions, and
so on. But the essence of the model would be similar.13
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The investor’s problem is then to maximise her objective with respect to portfolio
composition, which is defined as follows
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where A is the risk aversion coefficient. This then solves for the optimal value of the
share of emerging market assets (w
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From our point of view, the key feature of this standard textbook result is that it enables
us to construct an implicit asset demand schedule on the basis of the same
characteristics of the asset demand schedule identified in the previous section of this
chapter. In other words, the positive (negative) effect on the demand for emerging
market assets of a decrease (increase) in the home rate of return r2,a ni n c r e a s e
(decrease) in the riskiness of home assets ￿2, a fall (rise) in pure contagion ￿12 and above
a l la ni n c r e a s ei nr i s ka v e r s i o nA.
In sum, both empirical evidence and analytical insights indicate that the emerging
market asset schedule is relatively unstable and can respond to exogenous changes in
risk appetite. In addition, momentum trading and investor herding both combine to
create asset bubbles quite independently of changes in the supply conditions or
‘fundamentals’. The effect of these demand fluctuations on individual emerging markets
is asymmetric in the sense that demand is disproportionately more unstable for higher-
risk assets. This evidence supports our interpretation of the nature of the asset demand
schedule at the aggregate level, but also implies that changes in aggregate risk aversion
should be made endogenous in a dynamic formulation.
4 ‘An orderly market’ – the effects of official interventions on the asset demand
schedule
In combination, the two previous sections of this paper imply that if the market is to
become more ‘orderly’ and if capital flows to developing countries are to be increased
in both volume and maturity, supply-side measures alone will not be sufficient. To the
issue of intervention in asset demand we must now turn, therefore.
Where a full set of prices does not exist, or there is not perfect information about them,
even if firms and households act perfectly competitively (taking prices as parametric)
then the market equilibrium – if it exists – is not welfare maximising (Atkinson and
Stiglitz 1980). This is particularly true of financial markets, because a full set of futures
markets, and of markets for all risks, usually does not exist. Again, the existence of
externalities such as the liquidity effect of major agents leaving the market can also lead14
to market failure or ‘absence of markets’. Firms (or individuals, or governments) cannot
issue unlimited bonds at given risk premium over current interest rates, because the risk
premium depends on the amount borrowed and the collateral available.
Lenders will not lend even at higher interest rates (or even more collateral) because this
would both increase the risk and dissuade good borrowers. The profit maximising loan
book for a bank thus takes the form of rationing – that is a limit on the overall level of
loans to particular classes of borrowers or type of assets. Asymmetric information
(where borrowers have more knowledge of the likelihood of default than lenders) will
also lead to a situation where assets may be sound, but no one is willing to lend – a
‘collapsed market’ (Hiller 1997). Under these circumstances, a small increase in the
perceived risk for some borrowers, or a reduction in the overall supply of funds, can
cause the credit market for a whole class of borrowers to collapse (Mankiw 1986). The
consequences for macroeconomic stability in a single economy are now widely
recognized (Stiglitz and Weiss 1992). They are logically even more significant for
international capital markets. Specifically, the absence of full market clearing leads to
the serious problem of ‘market access’: low-income countries do not have access to
international bond markets (at whatever premium) while middle-income countries can
easily lose access due to regional contagion or political events (World Bank 2000).
Asymmetric information problems are to some extent resolved by ratings agencies –
although their record has been very mixed (IMF 1998, 1999). Externalities also exist in
the form of overheating on market upswings and liquidity problems on downswings;
both of which may justify supervisory oversight and last resort lending. Contract risk in
the case of equities is not great, and the legal costs of transactions are reduced by the
use of American or Global Depository Receipts being traded on developed country
markets. However, in the case of bonds there are serious externality and contract
problems created in cases of bond default and debt workouts, where the interests of
individual bondholders may not coincide – causing a ‘common action’ problem. In the
case of bank lending, information problems should be less, because of the banks’
expertise and information provided by their branches. The risk of default, however,
remains high due to liquidity problems and financial fragility in emerging markets, so
banks tend to lend short-term and preferably to banks and multinational affiliates. What
is more, bank lending tends to be highly volatile in reaction to political and regional
events, and to be strongly pro-cyclical as well; so it does not provide support in times of
economic difficulty, while tending to increase credit availability during macroeconomic
booms.
Broadly speaking, we can identify three traditional existing forms of public intervention
in the flow of private capital into emerging markets:
i) Intermediation between developed country lenders (i.e. global capital markets)
and developing countries, based on particular advantages of information,
diversification or contract enforcement that such institutions may have over the
private sector in order to provide longer-term loans than the market is willing
to offer, or to gain access for countries considered not to be credit worthy; this
being the role of the World Bank and the other (regional) Multilateral
Development Banks.
ii) Efforts to ensure that financial contracts are more likely to be enforced, either
by improving the economic and institutional strength of the borrowing country,15
or by using international leverage to ensure that contracts are honoured in debt
workouts; and for longer-term lending to offer investment insurance facilities
and export credit guarantees on the same principle.
iii) Provision of counter-cyclical finance as a lender of last resort in situations
where the borrower is fundamentally solvent but there is a liquidity shortage
due to market expectations which become self-fulfilling where the maturities
of borrowers’ assets and liabilities are mismatched (the role of the IMF);
helping to restructure and refinance outstanding developing country liabilities
where longer-term solvency obtains, and to allocate the costs of writing off
debt when the borrower is insolvent – equivalent to bankruptcy proceedings in
national private sectors.
All three forms of intervention thus relate to what we have defined as the supply
schedule for emerging market assets. More recently, the dissemination of reliable
information to capital markets on the quality of assets and borrowers and thus reducing
the asymmetric information problem has become the key element of the G7 Financial
Stability Forum’s ‘Compendium of Standards’10 for the strengthening and extension of
existing systems of global financial supervision, increasing the availability and
timeliness of information (mainly of official statistics) to the markets.
The positive incentive for compliance despite the high administrative cost is that those
emerging markets that adhere to the new rules will enjoy enhanced market access,
although this is only a potential benefit. The specific penalties for non-compliance are
clearer: financial regulators in OECD countries can apply penalties or constraints such
as capital requirements on investors acquiring assets in non-compliant countries; and
official lenders (particularly the IMF) could refuse in advance to support non-compliant
countries. These disincentives might be effective in reducing foreign interest in non-
compliant countries, but they would also tend to reinforce the cyclical nature of investor
interest in emerging markets and thus undermine sustainable growth in developing
countries.
Moreover, as we have seen, the market does not always use information effectively, as
much depends upon the models that are used to analyse statistical data. These models
are generally backward looking (which leads to ‘over-shooting’), while traders react to
‘news’ that does not reflect the underlying fundamentals. Those rules proposed by the
FSF that attempt a definition of ‘best practice’ in the policies of emerging markets
related to economic reform and policy conduct are problematic because the nature of
‘sound fundamentals’ is not always agreed (e.g. the acceptability of capital controls) and
indeed tends to change over time.11 Precisely because, capital markets do not function
well on their own, which is why a high degree of prudential regulation of their own
national capital and banking markets is maintained by developed countries themselves
in order to ensure the integrity of markets by regulating creditors as much as – if not
more than – debtors (Goodhart et al. 1998). Nonetheless, international measures to
10 The FSF Compendium of Standards contains the work of six separate bodies: the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD).
11 As has, for that matter, the content of and support for the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’.16
stabilise capital flows that affect source countries have been very limited. The increased
role of rating agencies in rating countries or companies proposed by the Basle
Committee could even risk increasing negative pro-cyclical features of bank lending
and make it more difficult for poorer countries (and companies in those countries) to get
access to bank lending. Current proposals on banks would also lead to greater role of
banks’ own value-at-risk (VAR) models in setting the regulatory capital requirements,
which may strengthen – rather than decrease – the propensity to boom-bust flows and
the bias against emerging markets.
Proposals for the revision of bond contracts so as to permit majority bondholder
decisions (so-called ‘collective action clauses’) in situations of debt restructuring are an
important step forward, but they do not constitute a measure to alter the demand
schedule. In effect, such measures alter bond quality by making the consequences of
default more certain and thus allowing better risk pricing. This is in marked contrast to
OECD markets, where fiscal and regulatory incentives are used to encourage
institutional investors to take longer-term positions (Davis 1995).
Table 1 (appears at the end of the text) shows key elements of investment regulation on
pension funds for a number of industrialised countries (OECD 2001). It is clear that UK
and US pension funds are among the least closely regulated in the developed world. The
pressure for more active portfolio allocation to manage risk and the need for higher
returns to support an ageing population mean that emerging market assets are
potentially a valuable component of portfolios if the market were less cyclical. There is
no explicit regulatory constraint on pension funds holding securities issued by (or
backed by assets of foreign investors in) developing countries. In contrast, other EU
pension funds are much more closely regulated with considerable restrictions on their
portfolio composition - mainly designed to reduce the risk of the fund failing but also to
generate a market for long-term domestic government and corporate debt on the one
hand and for property mortgages on the other.
In sum, despite the fact that demand shifts account for a large part of emerging market
instability, due to their asymmetric effects, official intervention has been concentrated
almost entirely on asset on supply conditions alone. Those interventions that might
affect demand – such as new information standards and bank capital adequacy rules –
will probably have little effect at best and further destabilise demand at worst.
5 Conclusions
This chapter has set out to demonstrate how shifts in the demand schedule for emerging
market assets affect asset prices, asset quality (e.g. default risk) and asset stocks – and
thus capital flows. In doing so we have identified a number at points at which
macroeconomic theory and evidence on aggregate flows and microeconomic evidence
and theory on portfolio adjustment can be brought together to define the key
components of this demand schedule. We have established that shifts in this demand
schedule itself, independently of conditions in emerging markets, account for a large
part of the changes in observed capital flows. But this task is far from complete, for we
still lack a formal analytical definition of this schedule; after which a corresponding
definition of the supply schedule – including the determinants of borrowing decisions
and interactive effect of the flows themselves on asset quality – would also be needed17
before a well-grounded reduced form estimation model be constructed for econometric
testing on the data.
None the less some tentative policy conclusions can be drawn from our argument so far.
The first is to suggest that G3 governments should pay more attention to the negative
effects on emerging markets of volatility within OECD capital markets. Relatively small
fluctuations in G3 interest rates and exchange rates (and the related capital account
variations resulting from investment-saving imbalances) cause absolute shifts in the
emerging market asset demand schedule that are very large in relation to the economies
of the host countries. However, the fact that the G3 is unwilling (or unable) to adopt
mutual macroeconomic coordination rules in order to sustain their own economies
implies that they unlikely to do so in order to help developing countries.
Given the inevitability of macroeconomic cycles within the G3 zone there would appear
to be two other lines of possible policy development in order to stabilise capital flows
towards emerging markets from the ‘demand perspective’. The first would be to
encourage – by a combination of regulatory changes and tax incentives – G3
institutional investors to acquire and hold emerging market assets of a longer maturity
than at present. This would in effect both shift the demand ‘upwards’ and reduce its
volatility over the cycle by increasing risk appetite on a structural basis. The advantages
to institutional investors would, of course, be higher long-term yields without the excess
risk generated by the market instability of the past decade.
The second would be to create greater liquidity in the market by encouraging ‘market
makers’ (which could be the international financial institutions themselves) to make an
explicit commitment to counter-cyclical intervention so as to stand ready to buy assets
from the private sector in the downswing of the cycle (when risk appetite declines) and
sell in the upswing. This form of provision of liquidity would probably be more
effective than the present efforts at last-resort lending once crises have occurred,
particularly since it would reduce the ex ante volatility of emerging market assets and
thus enhance their attractiveness to institutional investors.
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Investment regulation of pension funds in nine OECD countries, 2001
Direct limits on domestic asset holding (%)
COUNTRY Equity Real estate Corporate
bonds
Investment
funds
Loans Bank deposits Direct limits on foreign investments
A u s t r i a 5 0 2 0 ****N o n - E u r o i n v e s t m e n t s a n d f o r e i g n p r operty
investments 50% max.
Belgium 65q;3 0 u 40¹ * 30 40¹ * Localisation requirement: only assets located
in EC, but includes securities issued by
authorised institutions. 65% OECD equities,
5% foreign investment funds, non-OECD
equities barred.
France 65q;0 . 5 u 0* 1 0
Germany 30q;1 0 u 25 50 30 50m;5 0 o 50 30% EU equity, 25% EU property,
6% non-EU equity, 5% non-EU bonds.
Italy * * * 20 * 20 Debt and equity securities not traded in
regulated markets: OECD 50%, non-OECD
barred. Non-OECD traded in regulated
markets 5%.
Japan * * *****
Spain *q;1 0 u * * * 10² 15 No limits for OECD countries.
U K ****N o e m p l o y e r -
related loans
**
U S *******
Notes: 1. Joint limit. 2. If no mortgage guarantee.
Key: * indicates no limits, q quoted equity, u unquoted, m mortgage loans, o other.
Source: OECD (2001), correct as at May 2001, abridged by Alex Cobham, FTP
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